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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff brought this suit to quiet title to 4 rods 
of his deeded premises described in paragraph one of 
his complaint. Defendants filed a counterclaim assert-
ing title in them to 19 feet of plaintiff's premises, lying 
north of a board fence, which they alleged plaintiff 
- -surveyed, built and agreed to in 1905 as a boundary line. 
All of this plaintiff denied, and testified that the fence 
was built when he came. (tr. 37) 
Thus this is a boundary line dispute between plain-
tiff and defendants. Their titles were deraigned from. a 
common source, from the Estate of Halver 0. Tiller, 
deceased, who owned both tracts as part of a larger 
tract during his lifetime. The decree of Distribution 
in said estate, (Ex. H) dated July 5, 1902, distributed 
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the south one chain ( 4 rods) to Edith M. Tiller, who 
in turn deeded the same to the plaintiff August 1, 1904, 
(Ex. L) and the plaintiff thereby became the owner 
of the south 4 rods of the Halver 0. Tille·r premises. 
The adjoining 4 rods (1 chain) on the north were dis-
tributed to George Tiller, defendants' grantor and pred-
ecessor in interest; and the north tract, not involved 
herein, was distributed to Helen Tiller ( tr. 7) 
Each of said three tracts thus distributed are de-
scribed by metes and bounds, made by a surveyor, as 
the executrix, Mrs. Anna Peery, testified her attorney 
W. w. Maughan had it surveyed, at time of said pro-
bate proceedings ( tr. 60,66), the respective descriptions 
of each tract (as the abstracts show) have always re-
mained the same-a mete and bound description. The 
.boundary descriptions clearly show that there is no un-
certainty, that the north line of plaintiff's lot coincides 
with and is the south line of defendants' lot (see Ex. 
J) and that the boundary line between them is an east 
and west line, commencing 6.88 chains south of the 
northeast corner of lot 1, plat '' B '' Logan City Survey, 
and running thence west 2.43 chains. The court found, 
''the means of ascertaining the true line has always been 
available''. 
One important and controlling fact in this case is 
the mistake of fact, a mutual mistake of fact, which the 
lower court refused to notice, meet, or recognize. It 
concerns the one rod strip of ground adjoining on the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
south side of plaintiff's premises, which belonged to 
Logan City, but which the plaintiff (and also the Tiller 
people) mistakenly believed was his property. If that 
one rod had belonged to plaintiff, then he would have 
had approximately 4 rods south of said fence, (all but 
2% feet). Plaintiff continued in that belief until his 
premises were surveyed by the City Engineer, when 
the curb and gutter was put in, in 1948 (Ex. M) 
(tr. 39-43) The plaintiff testified: "I think that's 
what fooled us." ( tr. 45) "I didn't know Logan City 
owned it, but thought that Tiller owned it." (tr. 46) 
''He (Tiller) figured it was part of his property and I 
thought it was too.'' (tr. 47) ''I knew we had 4 rods 
apiece. I sat the house down where I thought it was 
on my ground." (tr. 48, 79) (Plaintiff built his house 
next to said one rod strip which he has used through 
the years as a driveway). 
The Tiller people likewise labored under said mis-
take of fact, as we shall later point out. 
Other important and controlling facts are: (a) 
Plaintiff knew that the fence was not on the boundary 
line. ( tr. 76) 
(b) There is no evidence of any dispute. On this 
point the court found: "Neither the defendants nor 
any of their predecessors in interest, so far as can be 
ascertained, ever knew that there was any thought of 
dispute of the property line until the time hereinafter 
mentioned.'' 
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(c) There is no evidence of any uncertainty or in-
definiteness. This counsel sought unsuccessfully to 
establish by defendant's grantor, George Tiller, thus: 
Q. Did you know whether or not there was an indefinite-
ness existing as to that property~ A. Never heard of 
any. (tr. 4) 
(d) There 1s no evidence that the plaintiff had 
agreed to accept said fence as the boundary line between 
them. 
Plaintiff denied that he had done any surveying, or 
constructed said fence, and testified that the fence was 
there when he came. (tr. 37) Plaintiff alleged and the 
evidence shows that he executed to the Fedral Land 
Bank a $2,000 mortgage, also a Public Welfare Lien 
to the State of Utah. The court, without ordering said 
bank or the State be made a party, quieted title in de-
fendants to plaintiff's 19 feet north of said fence, cover-
ed by said mortgage in violation of Civil Rules 13(g). 
The plain tiff admits that he built his garage, chicken 
coop and other buildings up to said fence, due to his 
mistaken belief that the one rod strip was his property. 
( tr. 79) As soon as he learned the facts, the plaintiff 
procured a quit claim deed for said one rod from Logan 
City (Ex. P) ( tr. 30-31) and then tried to effect a 
settlement with defendants. (tr. 29, 40) When that 
failed, he commenced moving the fence over on the true 
line, which defendants forbade. (Ex. K) ( tr. 36) Plain-
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tiff then filed this suit to quiet title to his deeded 4 rods. 
Plaintiff testified that he knew that said fence was 
not on the correct line; that he had about 2% feet on 
the north side of said fence. ( tr. 76) 
No issue was raised as to the ownership of said one 
rod south of plaintiff's property. That issue was In-
jected by the trial court. (tr. 83) The evidence, by 
defendants' own expert witness, Crockett, showed that 
Halver 0. Tiller never acquired any interest in said one 
rod. And that the same belonged to Logan City. ( tr. 
94()) (See also tr. 85). The court nevertheless found: 
(1) "That Halver 0. Tiller was the true owner of 
said one rod strip, and (2) that Logan City never was 
the owner of said south one rod of land.'' 
There is no allegation or issue and no evidence con· 
cerning payment of taxes on said one rod strip, and no 
evidence of any ''mixup'' in assessment of property, the 
trial court nevertheless found: ''Through a mixup in 
connection with the assessment of property, the said one 
rod above referred to has never been 'assessed for 
taxes.'' 
It was agreed in open court that plaintiff and de-
fendants had each paid all general and special taxes 
on their respective record titles. Plaintiff's 4 rods in-
cluded the 19. feet in dispute (27.27% of his 4 rod front-
age). The abstract and tax record (Ex. A, E, F, N, 0,) 
show that plaintiff paid,-on sidewalk assessment., $82.50: 
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on sewer assessment $259.12; on curb and gutter assess-
ment, since dispute arose, $137.65; on general taxes 
since dispute arose, $167.00. Total: $646.27. .The lower 
court refused to require defendants to compensate 
plaintiff for any taxes he had paid on said 19 feet, 
amounting to about $126.00, but awarded that property 
free and clear to defendants' because: "plaintiff has 
never paid any general or special taxes upon said one 
rod strip.'' 
There is no evidence or claim of any buildings or 
improvements of any kind up,on the 19 feet in dispute. 
Defendant Smith testified that he did not check the 
description but merely took it for granted that the fence 
was on the line. ( tr. 20) 
The plaintiff and his two sons positively testified 
that for many years they had used the premises north 
of said fence for hauling hay, beet pulp, and for their 
derrick horse. (tr. 30, 39, 42-3 50, 53) Defendants' 
witnesses mainly denied they had seen such use. On 
such evidence the court found plaintiff. had never used 
the premises north of said fence. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON WHICH 
APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY ON APPEAL 
Point No. 1. The court err~dJ in failing to meet, 
find, or recognize the fact, clearly shown by the evidence, 
that the plaintiff had been acting under a mistake of 
fact (a mutual mistake of fact) in recognizing or assum-
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ing that the alleged fence was near the boundary line, 
due to his mistaken belief that the one rod, adjoining 
on the south of his premises, was his property. 
Point No. 2. The court erred in entering its decree 
quieting title in defendants ''of that certain property 
north of the fence line," ( 19 ft. of plain tiff's premises) 
for (1) the evidence does not show any uncertainty or 
any dispute as to the boundary line, but shows that the 
fence was already there when plaintiff came ; fails to 
show that the plaintiff had ~fever agreed to accept said 
fence as a boundary line, or that defendants had paid 
any taxes on the 19ft. in dispute; and (2), the court did 
not have jurisdiction to enter its decree quieting title to 
said 19 feet without first ordering the State and the Fed-
eral Land Bank be made parties to this proceeding, as 
required by 13(g) Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Point No. 3. Some of the court's findings are out-
side the issues, without evidence to support them, and 
contrary to the evidence: (a) The court's two way find-
ing, ''that Halver 0. Tiller was the true owner of the 
one rod strip south of plaintiff's premises"; that 
"Halver 0. Tiller in his lifetime considered the one 
rod of land at the south end of plaintiff's premises 
as part of said Tiller's property." (b) The court's 
finding, ''that Logan City was never the owner of the 
said one rod strip''; also (c)' the court's finding that, 
''through a mixup in the assessment of property the 
said one rod has never been assessed for taxes.'' 
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Point No. 4. Some of the court's findings are con-
trary to the weight of affirmative evidence: (a) The 
court's finding that plaintiff had not used the premises 
north of the fence for hauling beet pulp, hay, coal, der-
rick horse, etc.; and (b), the court's finding that the 
plaintiff did or caused the survey to be made and that 
he built the alleged board fence, on uncertain and 
indefinite testimony of George Tiller and Mrs. Peery, 
and against the positive testimony of the plaintiff to 
the contrary and that the fence was there when he 
purchased his premises. 
Point No. 5. The court erred in finding and holding 
that plaintiff is estopped from asserting title to his 
19 feet north of said fence. 
Point No. 6. The court erred in justice and equity, 
by refusing to assess defendants with a pro-rata share 
of the special improvement and other taxes paid by 
the plaintiff on said 19 feet, after awarding said prem-
ises to defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
As we think the mistake of fact, stated in Point No. 
1, herein, is one of the controlling factors in this case 
which excludes it from the rule permitting new boundary 
line to be fixed by oral agreement, we want to refer 
a little more to the testimony of the parties in order 
to show that here was a mistake of fact which controlled 
plain tiff's actions through the years, and that the mis-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
take \Yas also m~ttual Jn£stake of fact-that the Tillers 
as well as the plaintiff were misled and believed anr] 
understood that said one rod strip was part of the 
Tiller estate, \vas deeded to the plaintiff by Edith M. 
Tiller. Thus : 
George Tiller: "I never heard before that the sur-
veyor gave me over 5 rods and Blanchard less than 
3 rods. (tr. 11) Edith and I each got 4 rods. I didn't 
intend to deed away any of Blanchard's property. ( tr. 
14) When the fence was put up, I figured Mose Blan-
chard got 4 rods south of the fence. The deeds would 
call for the right property, I thought (tr. 12) I didn't 
figure he was turning any of his property over to 
me." (tr. 13) 
Mose Blanchard: ''That one rod fooled us all, I 
am satisfied about that.'' 
Q. (by Mrs. Anna Peery) When did you find out 
about this rod 1 
A. When they put the curb and gutter down, three 
years ago. Never knew about it before. (Ex. C) Yes, 
if I had known it, I would have had it done (fence 
moved) long, long ago. (tr. 77, 41) "It was the one 
rod there that threw us crooked.'' ( tr. 78) 
Mrs. Anna Peery: Testified that her father said: 
''I'll have to ·buy that little piece of ground so it can 
parallel with the street." "I thought that all belonged 
to my father's estate. (tr. 65) I intended for Mose to 
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have 4 rods as his deed calls for, but I thought it was 
measured from the lower fence. (tr. 68) It was my 
understanding my father bought that from Logan City. 
There was, of course, no intention on our part that 
Blanchard should have less than 4 rods. ( tr. 70) 
RULE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
Appellant is not contending against the rule of 
-boundary by acquiescence, long recognized in this state, 
when the location of the true boundary line between ad-
joining tracts is unkown, uncertain or in dispute, the 
owners thereof may by parole agreement irrevocably 
establish the true boundary line between them. That 
rule has been settled by this Court as the law in this 
State. Brown v. Milliner, 232 P 2d 202; Tripp v. Bagley, 
276 P. 912, 69 ALR 1417; Rydalch v. Anderson, 107 P 
25; Holmes v. Judge, 87 P. 1014. 
EXCEPTIONS TO RULE 
But there are a number of exceptions or limits 
to the above rule which this court and other jurdictions 
have recognized as defenses thereto, and which, if the 
'facts warrant, will prevent the above rule from being 
applied so as to change the boundary line from the true 
line by oral agreement or by acquiescence of adjoining 
owners in disregard of the Statute of Frauds. · Thus: 
(1) Mistake of Fact. _In the case of Brown v. Mil· 
liner, supra, this court, speaking through Chief Justice 
Wolfe, said : 
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"In Holmes v. Judge, supra, we declared that 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 'rests 
upon sound public policy, with a view of pre-
venting strife and litigation concerning boundar-
ies' and that 'While the interests of society re-
quire that the title to real estate shall not be 
transferred from the owner for slight cause, or 
otherwise than by law, these same interests de-
mand that there shall be stability in boundaries~. 
However, in that case we were careful to mark 
off the limits of the rule. Said the court : 'We 
do not wish to be understood as holding that the 
parties may not claim to the true boundary, 
where an assumed or agreed boundary is located 
through mistake or inadvertence, or where it is , 
clear that the line as located was not intended 
as a boundary, and where a boundary so located 
has not been acquiesced in for a. long term of 
years by the parties in interest'. (31 Utah 269, 
87 P. 1014.) 
The law here involved is fully annotated in 69 
ALR 1430-1533, following Tripp v~ Bagley, supra. Al-
though there are some cases to .the contrary, the big 
majority of the cases there cited under the subhead 
"Effect of Mistake" on pages 1485-1489 of said .an- I 
notation, hold in harmony with Brown v. Milliner, that 
where a party has acted under. a mistake of fact, 
especially a mutual mistake of fact, such party is not 
estopped, but may claim to the true line upon discovery 
of the mistake, just as plaintiff tried to do when 
he discovered his mistake. We quote excerpts from a 
few cases under said subheading ''Effect of Mistake.'': 
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''In v1ew of the mutual mistake of the parties, 
the facts did not raise the issue of an agreed boundary 
line." 8 S.W. 549 (Mo.). "In such a case there is a 
failure to find the true line through accident or mis-
take." 80 N.E. 350 (Ill.). "A party will not forfeit 
his estate ·by mere mistake nor can the Statute of 
Frauds be thus evaded." 70 Am. Dec. 57 (Ohio). "Such 
a parole agreement founded in mistake would not be 
binding by way of estoppel or otherwise.'' 5 Met. 469 
(Mass.). ''When the mistake was discovered, neither 
of the parties was estopped from claiming his rights.'' 
14 S.E. 153 (W.Va). 
Even the contra cases cited first under said sub-
head "Effect of .Mistake", page 1485, which hold the 
oral agreement valid notwithstanding the mistake of. 
fact, can all be distinguished from the facts in case at 
bar. 
Thus it is our contention that the rule establishing 
boundary line by acquiescene cannot and should not be 
applied against plaintiff in case at bar, because his 
acquiescenece (if the court holds he acquiesced in said 
said fence as a boundary line) has rested on his mis-
taken belief and understanding all through the years, 
until 1948 when his premises were surveyed, that said 
south one rod strip was part and parcel of the 4 rods 
he purchased from Edith 0. Tiiler in 1904. Soon as 
he learned the facts he took action to have fence moved 
(tr. 19,50) 
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(2) Part·ies knew fence was not on true line. In 
Tripp v. Bagley, supra, this court held that if the par-
ties kne'Y that the fence 'vas not on the true boundary 
line, then 'Ye have an exception to the above rule; 
that in such case the true boundary line could not be 
changed by n1ere acquiescence or change of possession 
''even though such change in possession continues 
for a long period of time.'' Said the court : 
''The question for determination in this case is 
wether the facts here bring it within the general 
rule or constitute an exception thereto ... It 
thus appears that the partites to this suit knew 
that the fence C-D-E did not and could not be 
along the true boundary line between the prop-
erty owned by the plaintiff and that owned by 
the defendants ... This court has recognized the 
rule that, where coterminous landowners know 
the location of the true boundary line, they may 
not establish a valid boundary line between their 
lands by mere parole agreement at a place other 
than the true line ... If adjoining landowners 
acquiesce in a division line, with knowledge of 
the location of the true line and with the design 
and purpose of thereoy transferring a tract of 
land from one to the other, such acquiescence 
alone will not operate as a conveyance. Land 
cannot be conveyed from one person to another 
by merely a change in possession, even though 
such change in possession continues for a long 
period of time. '' 
We have already pointed out that plaintiff testi-
fied that he knew that said fence did not give him 
his 4 rods (even assuming the south one rod belonged 
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to him) that he th9ught he had about 2~ feet north 
of said fence, hence case at bar comes within the same 
exception as this court pointed out and held in Tripp 
v. Bradley, to-wit: If one of the adjoining landowners 
has knowledge, or understands, that the fence in ques-
tion is not on the true line, the rule permitting a 
boundary line to be fixed by parole agreement or ac-
quiescence does not apply. 
(3) NoDispute and No Uncertainty. As we have 
seen the plaintiff and defendants and their grantors 
in interest all testified, and the court found, that there 
had never been any dispute concerning the boundary 
line between them. The witnesses all agreed that the 
fence had never been discussed. One of· the necessary 
prerequisites, a condition precedent, for the above rule 
to apply is that the "location of the true boundary 
line must be in dispute or uncertain". If there is no 
dispute and no indefiniteness, what is there for the 
parties to agree upon~ We copy from page 1502 of 
the above annotation in 69 A.L.R. thus: 
''In Talbot v. Smith (1910) 56 Or. 117, 107 P. 
480, 108 P. 125, to defeat the description in a 
deed, the plaintiff urged that a fence line or a 
stake set up by someone had been acquiesced in 
for a long time, and should control. The court 
said: 'But there never was any dispute as to 
where the line should be; nor was there any cir .. 
cumstance to call for a settlement of a dispute. 
Legal agreements as to disputed ·boundaries are 
based upon the fact that the true line is not only 
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in dispute, but to some extent undefined and un-
known.' 
''In Jeffries v. Sheehan (1928) 242 Mich. 167 
218 N.W. 703, the court said: 'If the boundary 
line of lot 28 was never in dispute and the fenced 
in portion of lot 2 was but an encroachment, 
then plaintiff's right, if any, to the disputed 
strip, rested upon prescription, and not on a 
boundary line established by acquiescence.' '' 
Defendants, in case at I?ar, cannot succeed in their 
suit (counter-claim) in prescription, for they failed to 
prove that they had ever paid any taxes on the 19 feet 
in question. 
Neither did defendants prove .any uncertainty or 
indefiniteness. The respective deeds prove just the con-
trary. Appellant contends that is certain which can 
be made certain. That which is certain and definite 
will prevail, 11 C.J.S. 538-9. The premises are described 
in each deed by metes and bounds. Each tract is tied 
to the N.E. corner of Block 1 Plat "B", Logan City 
Survey. Both deeds were recorded. The division line 
is thus fixed by the descriptions in the deeds, which 
defendants seek to defeat in case at bar. As we have 
pointed out, George Tiller said he had never heard of 
any uncertainty, that he thought, "the deeds would call 
for the right property." ( tr. 12) 
"In Hartung -y. Witte (1884) 59 Wis. 285, 18 
N.W. 174, it was said that that is certain which 
can be made certain, and if the true line cannot 
be made certain by the deed and a survey, or 
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by calls and monuments mentioned in the deed, 
then, only, it may be made certain by acquiescence 
of the parties.'' 
In locating courses, the intent of the parties, as 
derived from the instrument itself, is to govern. 9 
C.J. 167. The burden of proof was upon defendants. 
8 Am. Juris. pg 810; 69 ALR 1489. 
( 4) No Agreement: A further fatality in defend-
ants' case is their failure to prove any agreement by 
the plaintiff to accept the fence as a division line. 
As we have seen, neither George Tiller nor Mrs. Peery 
testified that they had any such agreement with the 
plaintiff. They merely claimed that they saw the sur-
veyor drive the peg and heard him say, "this is the 
line" (tr. 9, 61) and that plaintiff made .no objection. 
That did not prove any agreement by plaintiff. We 
submit that only shows defendants' witnesses were con-
fused, that the survey they saw and testified about was 
the one di.rected by Attorney Maughan when he pro-
bated the Tiller estate. The court found that "plaintiff's 
property was distributed in accordance with the survey 
directed by the late W. W. Maughan.'' Why would 
plaintiff want a second survevy, 2% years later~ When 
the deed he received was certain and specific by mete 
and bounds~ Defendants do not explain. There was, 
of course, only one survey. Defendants' two main 
witnesses also contradict each other, thus: 
George Tiller testified that he saw plaintiff build 
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that old board fence. l\Irs. Peery testified it wasn't a 
board fence, but a hog-,vire fence. (tr. 71) We a·sk: 
'vhen 'vas it changed to the present old board fence~ 
They don't explain. Georg~ Tiller also testified that 
plaintiff built the fence first, and then built his house 
"about ten feet south of the fence ( tr. 5) ; Mrs. Peery 
testified that plaintiff built his house first, and then, 
when he 'vas ready to move his family in, he built the 
fence. ( tr. 62-3) 
Plaintiff testified that he started building his house 
1n 1904, after he bought his premises; that he "set 
the house on what I thought was my property", which 
shows that he then believed that said south rod was 
part of his property and that he built his house with 
reference to what he thought was his south lines, as he 
left only a driveway south of his house, not with refer-
ence to any fence on the north side of his house. 
We submit that defendants' evidence, that plaintiff 
built that fence is so confusing and contradictory that 
it falls of its own weight. We quote from Mrs. Peery's 
testimony: "Mose Blanchard knows that he built the 
fence. My 13 year old brother couldn't build it. We 
didn't have the money to build it with." ( tr. 71) "I 
lmow he built it because I saw him." "I didn't build 
it. My father didn't build it. I say Mose did it or his 
boys did. I don't know who did it." ( tr. 72) Mrs. 
Peery forgot the age of plaintiff's boys. Fred Blan-
chard is 47, ( tr. 50), so he was a mere infant in 1905. 
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George Blanchard is 40 (tr. 31) so he wasn't born for 
several years later. So plaintiff's boys didn't build 
that fence. 
Again, may we point out where defendants' wit-
nesses defeat their own testimony in their insistence to 
claim that plaintiff built that fence. If George Tiller 
was then only 13 years old, as Mrs. Peery said, then 
that conclusively proves that the survey which George 
and Mrs. Peery saw (when the surveyor said, "this is 
the line") was the one Attorney Maughan directed to 
be made, when he probated the Tiller estate. Mrs. Peery 
has already told us that George was 13 years old when 
his father died in 1901 (tr. 60) which was of course, 
before the estate was distributed, (July 5, 1902) and be-
fore plaintiff purchased his premises from Edith M. Til-
ler (Aug. 1, 1904) ; all of which shows that plaintiff was 
not then interested in that property and therefore took 
no part in and knew nothing about any survey, just as 
he testified. Note also this testimony by Mrs. Peery 
which shows the survey line was out in the lot : A. He 
(the surveyor) said, ''t~is is the line and it runs straight 
back to the river." Q. Was there a fence where the peg 
was driven~ A. No. That was in our garden where we 
had corn and potatoes. (tr. 61) 
For each and all of the foregoing reasons, we re-
spectfully submit and pray that the trial court's judg-
ment be vacated and this Court order title to ·be quieted 
in plaintiff as prayed for, and for his costs. 
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COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING PLAINTIFE 
TO PREPARE ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT 
The foregoing brief had all been written and sent 
to the printers when defendant's counsel, on July 18, 
1952, served a "Demand For Additional Evidence". 
On the .same day we filed ''Answer''· to said demand~ 
stating that "the transcript served June 21st, with 
designation of record, contains all matters essential to 
decision of questions presented by the appeal to the 
Supreme Court". We also asked counsel to "designate 
any point or item of testimony ommitted, in order that 
the same may be stipulated, or included in supplement-
al transcript, ''we acted under Rule 75 (e), which pro-
vides, ''All matters not essential to the decision of the 
questions presented on the appeal shall be ommitted". 
Plaintiff is an old man, confined to a wheel chair ; he is 
. 
on Relief and can ill" afford this additional, and, as we 
- -
think, unnecessary expense. 
----------- --~-- ------ --
Defendant's counsel refused to designate any omit-
ted item of testimony, but the next day served ''Designa-
tion of Record'' etc., and also ''Affidavit in Support of 
Relief for Failure to file Demand'' etc. in time, as re-
quired by Rule 75 (a). The court ordered plaintiff to 
file transcribed copy of all ommitted testimony, regard-
less of its materiality; and the court also restrained 
the Clerk from filing record of appeal with the Supreme 
Court ''until said additional testimony is transcribed.'' 
The court's order for plaintiff to furnish additional 
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testimony, is based on that part of rule 75(b) which 
reads: "If the designation does not include all the 
evidence, the appellant shall file a copy of such parts 
thereof as the respondent may need to enable him to 
designate the parts he desires to be added'' etc. ( coun-
sel requested the full record in order to enable him to 
decide what part he wanted.) Said provision thus is 
contrary to the spirit and purpose of Rule 75(e), for 
if respondents can arbitrarly demand under Rule 75(b) 
that all of the record be transcribed, how can appellant 
obtain any relief from unnecessary costs? How can ''all 
record be abbreviated under Rule 75(e) ¥ How can "all 
matter not essential to the decision be ommitted"Y 
1. Appellant submits that the court erred in per ... 
mitting respondent's designation of record to be filed 
after the time had expired; also that their designation 
was too indefinite, and that the affidavit for relief 
was insufficient to relieve respondents of their failure 
to file designation of additional portions of the record 
in time as required by Rule 75{ a). 
2. Appellant further submits and prays that Rule 
75 (b) be amended by this Court, by deleting that por-
tion thereof above quoted, and substituting therefor the 
toll owing: ''If the designation does not include all of 
the evidence, respondent Il!ay file a copy of such narts 
as he desires to have added, the expense of which shall 
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